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BIGELOW AEROSPACE'S COMMODITY JURISDICTION REQUEST UNDER ITAR
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SPACEFLIGHT

Mark J. Sundahl

Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
United States
mark.sundahl@law. csuohio. edu

ABSTRACT

On April 22, 2009, Bigelow Aerospace announced that the United States Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) had responded favorably to Bigelow's commodity jurisdiction
request to ease its regulatory burden under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Prior to this decision by the DDTC, the presence of foreign nationals on a Bigelow space station
would have been treated as an "export" of space technology under IT AR - thus requiring a
license from the DDTC in addition to other burdens. Bigelow Aerospace's successful commodity
jurisdiction request has removed these obstacles and, as a result, has breathed new life into the
private spaceflight industry. The DDTC's ruling in this case may also signal a broader shift in the
application of ITAR. At a minimum, the ruling is an encouraging indication of the DDTC's
sensitivity to the needs of the commercial spaceflight industry, which could result in the
continued relaxation of export controls over commercial space technology.

I.

II. ITARAND HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

INTRODUCTION

Only rarely do we see breakthroughs in
space law that bring clear and quantifiable
benefits to space companies. But such a
breakthrough occurred this year when the
United States Department of State's
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
(DDTC) exempted Bigelow Aerospace from
the need to acquire a license and comply
with other burdensome requirements under
the
International
Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) before allowing foreign
nationals aboard their expandable space
stations. The DDTC's ruling will allow
Bigelow Aerospace to more easily serve the
global market since Bigelow will no longer
have the bear these burdens for each foreign
national that would set foot in one of their
space stations. This article tells the story of
how Bigelow achieved this breakthrough and explores how this ruling will affect the
future of human spaceflight.

Export controls on space technology are
notoriously strict in the United States, where
all space technology is deemed to be
munitions and is therefore subject to the
complicated and restrictive IT AR export
regulations. Because the costs associated
with IT AR-compliance must be passed
along to the customer, the current
application of IT AR has harmed the ability
of U.S. companies to compete on the world
market. The seriousness of this regulatory
impediment is perhaps best illustrated by the
practice of certain European satellite
manufacturers to market "ITAR-free"
satellites - that is, satellites that are free of
the regulatory complexities and associated
costs that flow from IT AR.
Such
advertising ploys are not mere gimmicks,
but reflect the real benefit that satellite
operators enjoy when purchasing satellites
that are beyond the reach of IT AR. As a
result, European satellite sales have
increased, cutting deeply into the market-
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share of U.S. manufacturers. Complying
with IT AR is particularly difficult for
smaller companies that do not have an inhouse legal staff specializing in export
controls and already face a multitude of
challenges as they attempt to establish
themselves in the marketplace.
Technically speaking, ITAR prohibits
the export of any "defense article" without a
license from the Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls (DDTC). 1 All items listed on
the USML qualify as "defense articles,"
including, among other things, all
"spacecraft" and "satellites" - which would
presumably include Bigelow's space
stations.2
Of particular importance to Bigelow
Aerospace was that the concept of an
"export" is broadly defined under IT AR as
including not only the physical movement of
defense articles across the borders of the
United States, but also the disclosure of any
"technical data" relating to spacecraft to a
foreign national - even if the foreign
national is in the United States at the time of
disclosure. 3 The term "technical data" is
further defined as any information "required
for the design, development, [or] production
... of defense articles.'..i Disclosure of such
technical data without DDTC approval is
prohibited regardless of the form in which
such data is displayed or stored (whether in
documents, models, or other items) and
regardless of how the data is communicated
(whether by the sharing of documents,
email,
conversation,
or by
visual
inspection). 5 As a result, the mere presence
of a foreign national on a Bigelow space
station would be deemed to be an "export"
and would require a license.
Moreover, the provision of any "defense
services," which include the provision of
technical data, requires a Technical
Assistance Agreement with the recipient of

the data which must then be approved by the
DDTC. 6 The burdens of IT AR grow far
greater when a U.S. company launches a
space object from non-NATO territory.
First, a Technology Control Transfer Plan
has to be approved by the Department of
Defense. 7
Second, the Department of
Defense has to be notified in advance of any
discussions with foreign nationals related to
the launch - and the DOD then has the right
to monitor these discussions. 8 Finally, the
DOD has the right to send agents to the
launch site to monitor the launch as well as
all related activity and discussions (with all
travel expenses being borne by owner of the
space object). 9
III. THE IMPACT OF ITAR ON
BIGELOW AEROSPACE
The regulatory burdens of IT AR have
been eloquently described by Michael Gold,
the Corporate Counsel and Director of the
Washington office of Bigelow Aerospace.
In various publications, Mr. Gold has
described the surprisingly onerous (and
often nonsensical) demands that have been
placed on Bigelow Aerospace as the
company launched its prototype space
stations into orbit from Russia. 10
In what has become one of the more
famous examples of the regulatory burden
imposed by ITAR, Mr. Gold has described
how Bigelow Aerospace was required to
cover the travel expenses of DDTC officials
who traveled to Russia to monitor the launch
of Bigelow's prototypes in Russia in order
to ensure that the technology would not be
6

Id. §§ 120.9, 124. I et seq.
Id. §124.15(a)(l).
8
Id. §§124.15(a)(l), 124.15(a)(2).
9
Id. §124.15(a)(2).
0
' See, e.g., Interview with Michael Gold, Res
Commun is,
April
28,
2008,
at
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2008104128/i
nterview-mike-gold-corporate-counsel-bigelowaerospace; see also Mike N. Gold, Lost in
Space: A Practitioner's First-Hand Perspective
on Reforming the U.S. 's Obsolete, Arrogant, and
Counterproductive Export Control Regime for
Space-Related Systems and Technologies, 34
Journal of Space Law I 63 (2008).
7

1

International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22
United States Code of Federal Regulations
§127.l(a)(l) (hereinafter, C.F.R.).
2
Id. §§120.6, 121.I (Category XV).
3
Id. §120.17;seealsoid. §125.2(c).
4
Id. §120.lO(a)(l).
5
Id.; see also id. §§120.6, 125.2(c).
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shared with unauthorized individuals. The
government monitors kept watch over all of
Bigelow's equipment no matter how
ordinary - including a stand that was
nothing more than a simple table used to
hold one of the company's prototype space
stations prior to it being loaded into the
Space Head Module of the Dnepr. 11
Although
Mr.
Gold's
candid
commentary on Bigelow's struggles with the
ITAR regulations is at times pointed, he is at
the same time always fair - and even
complimentary - in his statements about the
DDTC staff who make rulings on a daily
basis about how IT AR applies to particular
situations. He praises the DDTC officers
who are on the front lines every day making
difficult determinations about the flow of
dangerous technology as "very intelligent
individuals within the Department of
State." 12 And his comments on ITAR go
beyond simple observations. Mr. Gold has
written insightfully about the potential
unconstitutionality of certain aspects of
IT AR
and
has
made
promising
recommendations for reform, such as his
call for the granting of greater discretion to
the DDTC officers who decide whether (and
under what conditions) a license is necessary
for the export of a particular product. 13
Prior to the DDTC ruling that is the
subject of this paper, Bigelow Aerospace
would have had to request a license from the
DDTC before allowing any foreign national
to set foot on one of its space stations. For
example, if Bigelow placed into orbit a
space station that was to be visited by
foreign nationals, IT AR would have
required that Bigelow obtain a license (by
submitting a DSP-5 form) for each foreign
national that was anticipated to inhabit the
space station. This requirement would also
apply to any third party that might purchase
a Bigelow space station. That is, if Bigelow

placed a space station into orbit and then
transferred the station to a U.S. purchaser,
the purchaser would have to obtain a license
prior to permitting a foreign national to enter
the space station. In addition to the costs of
seeking such a license, there would also
have been a risk that the DDTC would deny
a license, thus preventing the foreign
national from entering the space station at
all.
In addition, Bigelow would have been
required to enter into a Technical Assistance
Agreement with each foreign passenger
(which would then be subject to approval by
the DDTC).
Bigelow also faced the
possibility that the more burdensome
requirements regarding the creation of a
Technology Transfer Controls Plan and
DOD monitoring of all conversations with
foreign passengers would be triggered if the
space stations were launched from nonNA TO countries.
That these requirements would have
jeopardized the success of Bigelow's
operations is clear. For example, if a space
station were being used as a manufacturing
facility, the pool of potential non-U.S.
customers would be threatened by the ITAR
requirements - which could destroy the
sustainability of the venture, given the small
overall size of the global client pool.
IV. OVERVIEW OF COMMODITY
JURISDICTION REQUESTS
One way that a company can escape the
burdens of IT AR compliance is to ask the
DDTC to remove the company's technology
from the USML by way of a "commodity
jurisdiction request" (referred to hereinafter
as a "CJ request"). 14 When submitting a CJ
request, the applicant is requesting that the
DDTC remove the applicant's technology
from the USML - thus transferring the
technology to the jurisdiction of the
Department of Commerce (DOC) and its
Export Administration Regulations (EAR).
The benefit of a jurisdiction transfer to
the DOC can be significant (depending on

11

Res Communis, supra note 6.
Id.
Leonard David, Genesis-I: Reaching Escape
Velocity from Red Tape, Space.com, July 26,
2006, at http://www.space.com/businesstechno
logy/060726_itar_genesis-I .html.
12
13

14
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22 C.F.R. §120.4.

under ITAR. 18 Michael Gold had succeeded
in his argument that just because a person
has seen a space station doesn't mean that he
or she can build one.
This ruling was rather unusual, in that
the DDTC will typically decide to either
remove the technology at issue from the
USML (thus transferring jurisdiction over
the EAR and the Department of Commerce)
or to keep the technology on the USML and continue to require licenses for export.
In Bigelow's case, the technology remained
on the USML, but the requirements for a
license, Technical Assistance Agreement,
Technology Transfer Control Plan, and
monitoring will no longer apply with respect
to the mere presence of foreign nationals on
board a Bigelow space station.
Although it may appear that Bigelow
Aerospace fell short by not succeeding in
having their technology removed from the
USML, this ruling may tum out to be the
best result for Bigelow since a transfer of
their technology to the Department of
Commerce would have likely meant that a
license would have to have been sought
under the EAR. However, under the "nonlicensable" ruling, Bigelow does not have to
apply for licenses from either the DDTC or
the Department of Commerce.
Prior to this decision by the DDTC, the
presence of foreign nationals on a Bigelow
space station would have triggered the
various burdens under IT AR.
The
continuation of this policy would have
placed an extraordinary burden on Bigelow
due to the expensive and time-consuming
process
of complying
with
these
requirements for each foreign national
present on a Bigelow space station.
Bigelow's successful CJ request has
removed these obstacles and, as a result, has
breathed new life into the private spaceflight
industry.
It is worth noting that the DDTC ruling
is not without its limits. For example,

the technology being transferred) because
the EAR are notably less burdensome than
are the controls under ITAR. Generally
speaking, a company is far less likely to be
required to seek a license from the DOC
prior to the export of a controlled item (due
to numerous exceptions to the license
requirement and the lenient treatment of
exports to friendly countries). That said, the
EAR are similar to IT AR in one important
respect, namely, that both the EAR and
IT AR treat the sharing of controlled
technology with a foreign national as an
export (such sharing of information termed a
"deemed export" in the EAR). 15
V. BIGELOW AEROSPACE'S
COMMODITY JURISDICTION
REQUEST
On December 27, 2007, Bigelow
Aerospace submitted a CJ request to the
DDTC seeking to remove its expandable
space platform technology from the
USML. 16 Although the DDTC usually
strives to make a determination within sixty
days of submission, a decision was not to be
issued in this case for sixteen months.
Michael Gold remained philosophical during
what was unquestionably a suspenseful time
for him and Bigelow Aerospace. When
asked about the long wait, he showed no
impatience, but instead insisted that he was
more interested in a good decision rather
than a speedy decision.
The suspense was broken on April 22,
2009 when Bigelow Aerospace announced
that the DDTC had responded favorably to
its CJ request. 17 The DDTC had ruled that
the presence of foreign nationals on a
Bigelow space station was "non-licensable"

15

15 C.F.R. §734.2(b)(2)(ii).
Space News, "Bigelow Petitions State for
Export Jurisdiction Change," March 3, 2008;
Economist, "Space Technology: Earthbound.
Export Control in the Space Business has Gone
Overboard," Aug. 23, 2008.
17
Bigelow Aerospace has not released to the
public either its commodity jurisdiction request
or the DDTC's response.
16

18

As Michael Gold describes it, the ruling covers
not only the flight phase, but applies to the entire
"passenger experience" (which has several
aspects, from sales to training - and, ultimately,
the flight).
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prospective passengers who are nationals of
the so-called "Section 126.1 countries"
would still need a license from the
appropriate agency before being able to
enter a Bigelow space habitat. 19 Section
126.1 of ITAR states that "[i]t is the policy
of the United States to deny licenses and
other approvals for exports and imports of
defense articles and defense services,
destined for or originating in certain
countries . . . , [including] Belarus, Cuba,
Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela" as
well as to "countries with respect to which
the United States maintains an arms
embargo (e.g., Burma, China, Liberia, and
Sudan)."20 Whether foreign crew members
will also be allowed to fly without a license
could also conceivable depend on their
duties on board and their area of expertise,
since individuals with technical expertise
who are engaged at work on board may be
deemed as more capable of accessing and
understanding the technology around them.

only to Bigelow, it is likely that other space
companies will receive the same response to
similar CJ requests. There have been some
(unconfirmed) reports that both SpaceX and
Virgin Galactic have filed their own CJ
requests that rely on Bigelow's CJ request as
precedent. If these companies receive a
similar ruling from the DDTC, the space
tourism/human space flight industry will
suddenly have easier access to the market of
foreign nationals - both as passengers on
space tourism flights and potentially as crew
members.
From a broader perspective, Bigelow's
successful CJ request may signal a paradigm
shift in the application of IT AR - or at least
provides an encouraging indication of the
DDTC's sensitivity to the needs of the
commercial spaceflight industry.
If the
DDTC continues to exercise its discretion
with an understanding of how to balance
national security with commercial reality,
the commercial space industry would likely
benefit from a reasonable relaxation of
export controls.
The success of the Bigelow CJ request
may also point the way forward with respect
to the greater challenge of reducing the
IT AR burden on the commercial space
industry as a whole. For example, space
companies should consider cooperating in
an orchestrated series of CJ requests that
will have the effect of carving out certain
commercial technologies from IT AR
control. This reliance on the authority and
discretion of the DDTC officers and other
administrative staff is perhaps a more
realistic alternative to formally amending
the regulations. In the age of terrorism,
politicians are wary of supporting a bill that
eases the controls over munitions.
By
giving the DDTC officers an opportunity to
tailor the application of the existing
regulations in a reasonable manner, the
burden of IT AR on commercial space
enterprises could be reduced significantly.
Since a CJ request only affects the
operations of the requesting company, broad
reform would require a large number of
space companies to file their own request.
This would be a daunting task, but is one

VI. THE FUTURE IMPACT OF
BIGELOW'S COMMODITY
JURISDICTION REQUEST
The DDTC's ruling on Bigelow's CJ
request has been heralded by other
spaceflight companies
as a major
breakthrough that promises to significantly
ease the regulatory burden on their
operations. 21 Marc Holzapfel, counsel to
Virgin Galactic, called the ruling a "major
development" that will enable space
companies to avoid the "complicated,
expensive, and dilatory export approval
process."22 Likewise, the chief counsel of
SpaceX, Tim Hughes, praised the DDTC for
adopting "a common-sense approach to
ITAR.'m
Although the DDTC's ruling applies
19

22 C.F.R. §126.1.
Id.
21
Natasha Loder, Breaking News on US Export
Control, Overmatter, April 22, 2009, at
http: /lnatashaloder. blogspot. com/2009104/breaki
ng-news-on-us-export-control. html.
22 Id.
23 Id.
20
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that could be made easier if companies
would share their CJ requests in order to
enable other companies to submit similar
requests. This would obviously require the
sharing of valuable information with
competitors - but would be done in order to
achieve the greater goal of improving the
competitiveness of the U.S. industry as a
whole. A nonprofit organization might also
be created to assist companies with their CJ
requests. This flood of CJ requests could
alone transform the IT AR regulatory
environment - but it might also compel the
formal amendment of the IT AR regulations
so that commercial space technology would
be removed from the USML, and thus
spared from the crushing weight of ITAR
compliance.
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